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One of the most delightful things about this law review Symposium is 
that, unlike many other law review symposiums, we have been asked a 
question that is very hard to answer: What did the constitutional 
provisions protecting economic rights, including the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause—the subject of this essay—originally mean?  I am 
particularly honored to be a part of the discussion because another 
delightful thing about this Symposium is that the authors sharing this 
 
 * Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.  Thanks go to the Center for the 
Study of Constitutional Originalism at the University of San Diego School of Law for 
inviting me to participate in this conference.  I am also indebted to Amy Barrett, David 
Barron, A.J. Bellia, Tricia Bellia, Rick Garnett, and Bill Kelley, among others, for 
helpful comments and suggestions.  Jessica Laux provided excellent research assistance. 
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issue—present company excepted—happen to be the very individuals 
who have thought most seriously about and produced the best scholarship 
examining that very question.  And, while I do profess to be an originalist, 
my originalism is of the armchair, rather than academic, variety.  Very 
little of my scholarship focuses on the Takings Clause at all, and that 
which does is admittedly both history free and full of the soft law and 
economics utilitarian analysis that Dean Treanor has correctly observed 
dominates academic discussions of takings problems.1 
It is thus as an armchair originalist that I pose three questions about 
the use of history to support the dominant academic view that the 
compensation requirement of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, as 
originally understood, extended only to physical appropriations or 
invasions of private property by the government.  This position, which I 
will refer to as the “standard account” or “standard historical account,” 
certainly has attracted forceful dissents in the academy, most notably by 
the authors featured in this Symposium issue.  The view that Takings 
Clause protection against so-called regulatory takings is ahistorical, 
however, is commonly accepted enough to earn the endorsement of even 
Justice Scalia, who is both an originalist and a supporter of regulatory 
takings protection.2 
My first question about the standard historical account concerns the 
frequent reliance on the prevalence of colonial and founding era land use 
regulations to support the inference that the Takings Clause could not 
have been intended to reach regulatory takings.  In light of evidence 
suggesting that the founding generation knew about pervasive land use 
regulation, the argument goes, then surely the men who proposed, adopted, 
and ratified the Fifth Amendment also knew how to mandate compensation 
for regulatory takings.3  The inference, while logical enough, suffers from 
two related difficulties.  First, when ratified, the Fifth Amendment only 
 
 1. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 104–05 (2006); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question 
as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 936–37 (2003).  See also William 
Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political 
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 811 (1995) (characterizing dominant analysis in 
Takings literature).  This characterization of my own work is not intended to denigrate 
the excellent law and economics commentary, of both the soft and hard varieties, on the 
Takings Clause. 
 2. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) (“[E]arly 
constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of 
property at all.”). 
 3. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern 
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1252, 1283 (1996) [hereinafter Hart, 
Colonial Land Use Law]; John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the 
Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (2000) 
[hereinafter Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic]. 
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reached federal action, and the federal government lacked authority, in 
most cases, to enact the kinds of police power regulations that tend to 
raise regulatory takings questions.4  In other words, the enumerated 
powers provided far more comprehensive protection against regulatory 
takings than the Takings Clause.  Second, legal historians have tended to 
conflate local land use regulations with those enacted by state—or 
colonial—governments.5  Yet, the import of local regulations is significantly 
complicated by the fact that the distinction between “public” corporations— 
municipalities—and “private” ones—General Motors, was not completely 
developed until at least the early decades of the nineteenth century, and 
for some purposes, not until later.6  Therefore, land use regulations imposed 
by cities like New York and Boston, especially during the colonial era, 
might not be perfectly analogous to modern land use restrictions. 
My second two questions about the historical record supporting the 
standard account concern the interpretive weight attributed to state court 
decisions either interpreting a state constitutional compensation requirement, 
or in the absence of such a provision, discerning whether government 
action nonetheless necessitates compensation.  Early state decisions certainly 
provide important insights into the original meaning of the Takings Clause.  
Particularly to the extent that they were asked to resolve questions 
analogous to today’s regulatory takings problems, state court decisions 
can shed light on what the operative terms of the Takings Clause 
objectively meant at the time of the founding.  For example, would a 
member of the founding generation have understood the word take to 
sometimes cover confiscatory regulations?  Would he have understood 
property in a limited “thing-like” sense or a more modern relational 
one?7 
My first question about the use of state cases to understand what the 
Federal Takings Clause means is temporal; the second is substantive.  
Historians of the Takings Clause frequently draw upon cases decided 
 
 4. See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 
(1833) (holding that the Takings Clause only applies to takings by the federal 
government). 
 5. See Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 3, at 1273–79 (discussing state 
and local regulation); Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 3, at 1107–
13 (same).  See also generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND 
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1, 3, 6, 10, 16 (1996) (same). 
 6. See infra notes 42–54 and accompanying text. 
 7. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1163, 1188–91 (1999) (discussing competing conceptions of property). 
GARNETT.FINAL.DOC 10/21/2008  10:41:44 AM 
 
764 
well into the nineteenth century to support various, and competing, 
conclusions about the original reach of the compensation requirement.8  
Yet, it is unclear to me what weight should be given to the reasoning of 
judges separated from the founding by more than a generation or so.  As 
many scholars, including, again, other contributors to this Symposium, 
have observed, the thinking about economic and property rights underwent 
a profound ideological shift during the late eighteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.9  While I am ill-equipped to resolve the academic 
debate over the extent to which this shift had taken hold by the time of 
the Fifth Amendment’s ratification, the shift itself complicates the already 
problematic reliance on nineteenth century cases to elucidate the meaning 
of a late eighteenth century legal provision.10 
A final difficulty with the use of state cases is that they are relevant to 
original meaning analysis only to the extent that nineteenth century state 
courts were asking the same questions as modern courts faced with 
regulatory takings claims.  But, as Eric Claeys’s work suggests, it is not 
entirely clear whether they were asking the same questions.11  If nineteenth 
century courts were asked to resolve different questions than twentieth 
and twenty-first century ones, then the evidentiary weight of their 
decisions is significantly undermined. 
I.  THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY 
About the only thing conclusively established regarding the history of 
the Takings Clause is that the history of the Takings Clause plays little 
or no role in the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence.12  
The cases are peppered with apparently ahistorical gems, from Justice 
Holmes’s admonition in Pennsylvania Coal that a regulation that “goes 
 
 8. See infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text. 
 9. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 29–34, 54–58, 101–02 (2d ed. 1998) 
(discussing the evolution of thought about economic life during the nineteenth century); 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 (1977) 
(same); Treanor, supra note 1, at 819–27 (same). 
 10. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, History Lean: The Reconciliation of Private 
Property and Representative Government, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 593–94 (1995) 
(arguing that the founding generation strongly endorsed private property rights); Martin 
S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
523, 561–63 (1995) (challenging Epstein’s characterization). 
 11. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1562–63 (2003) (challenging the dominant interpretation of 
nineteenth century takings cases). 
 12. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 29 (1985) (“Historical arguments have played virtually no role in the 
actual interpretation of the clause.”). 
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too far” effects a taking,13 to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s articulation of a 
Goldilocks rule for regulatory exactions in Dolan: “We think the 
‘reasonable relationship’ test adopted by a majority of the state courts is 
closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of those previously 
discussed.”14  In fact, many scholars have argued that the most prominent 
exception to the Court’s practice of disregarding history when resolving 
regulatory takings claims—Justice Scalia’s invocation of “the restrictions 
that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance 
already place upon land ownership”15—was ill-conceived.16 
Why the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence has remained ahistorical 
is, in one sense, a puzzle.  After all, regulatory takings doctrine arguably 
underwent its most significant evolution during the decades when we all 
became originalists.  The Justices in the majority of the decisions reflecting 
that evolution were, without question, the Court’s most consistent 
originalists.17  One way to resolve this puzzle of non-originalism among 
originalists would be to assume that proponents of strong regulatory 
takings protection are favoring results-driven, rather than principle-
driven, outcomes.  For example, Justice Scalia’s admonition in Lucas 
that “[t]he practices of the States prior to incorporation of the Takings 
and Just Compensation Clauses, . . . were out of accord with any plausible 
interpretation of those provisions,”18 is, as William Treanor observed, 
arguably “at odds with his announced commitment to a doctrine of 
originalism and his explanation of what originalism means.”19 
Another explanation for the Court’s ahistorical approach to the 
Takings Clause—and perhaps for the regulatory takings “muddle” 
 
 13. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 14. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
 15. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
 16. Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes and the Common Law: Considering Inherent 
Limitations on Title, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and 
Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV. 77, 79 (1995); Bradley C. Karkkainen, The 
Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 
90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 837 (2006); Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice 
Scalia and the Faltering of the Property Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court, 57 
HASTINGS L.J. 759, 759–61 (2006). 
 17. Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 26 (“We 
are all originalists now.”).  See also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); 
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 
U.S. 825 (1987). 
 18. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 n.15. 
 19. Treanor, supra note 1, at 808. 
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generally20—is the fact that the Takings Clause is itself a historical 
puzzle.  Not only is the Takings Clause the only provision of the Bill of 
Rights that was not requested by a state ratifying convention, but there 
was also apparently not one word of discussion about it at the time it was 
proposed and ratified—not in Congress, either before or after its 
proposal, or in the states, either before or after its ratification.21 
Moreover, unlike many other provisions of the Constitution, the 
Takings Clause had no colonial or British antecedents: No colonial 
charter mandated compensation, even for physical appropriations, in all 
cases.22  Only two Colonies provided any per se protection against seizures, 
and only one of these protections—Massachusetts’s compensation 
requirement for seizures of personal property—was fully implemented.23  
The first state to adopt a takings clause, post Revolution, was Vermont 
in 1777; many states did not adopt takings clauses until well into the 
nineteenth century.24  While colonial—and later state—governments 
routinely compensated owners when their property was seized, 
compensation was a matter of legislative grace, rather than fundamental 
entitlement.25  Some scholars, notably William Treanor and Morton 
Horwitz, have argued that founding-era governments routinely refused 
to compensate owners when property was seized for roads.26  This 
reading of the historical evidence has been challenged, especially by 
James Ely, who argues that cases of noncompensation, far from being 
routine, were the rare exception to an expectation that any seizure 
required compensation.27 
The Takings Clause, however, represented a profound departure from 
voluntary remuneration practices, whatever their extent, by mandating 
just compensation for all takings by the federal government.  This 
reality—that the Takings Clause was itself ahistorical—poses a particular 
 
 20. See generally Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is 
Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 562–63, 594–96 (1984) (characterizing takings 
doctrine as a “muddle”). 
 21. See, e.g., Treanor, supra note 1, at 791. 
 22. Id. at 785. 
 23. Id. at 785–86 & nn.12 & 14 (citing Mass. Body of Liberties § 8 (1641) and 
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina art. 44 (1669)) (“Perhaps because the attempts to 
put the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina into operation were unsuccessful, . . . 
leading accounts have considered the Massachusetts [provision] . . . the only colonial 
precursor of the Takings Clause.”). 
 24. HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 63–64, 66; Treanor, supra note 1, at 789–91. 
 25. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 65–66; Treanor, supra note 1, at 785, 788–
89. 
 26. HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 63–65; Treanor, supra note 1, at 787–88. 
 27. See James W. Ely, Jr., “That Due Satisfaction May be Made:” The Fifth 
Amendment and the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 4–
14 (1992). 
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problem for originalists: In contrast to, for example, the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, it is impossible to draw upon 
pre-founding era interpretations of similar rights because there were 
none.28  One side effect of the Takings Clause’s ahistorical status has 
been the dominance of “original intent” scholarship seeking to recover 
the subjective meaning of the Clause’s terms to the elite group of men 
who proposed and ratified it.29  The writings of James Madison, who 
proposed the provision—apparently out of the blue—play a significant 
role in these academic exercises, for obvious reasons,30 as does the 
intellectual and ideological backdrop against which the Clause was 
proposed and ratified.31 
II.  THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND ORIGINALISM: THREE                             
HISTORICAL PUZZLES 
As an armchair adherent to the now dominant “original meaning” 
originalism, the questions posed by this essay shy away from these 
original intent debates.  This essay focuses instead on the historical 
evidence used to support the conclusion that the terms of the Takings 
Clause objectively excluded regulatory takings, rather than on the 
evidence hinting at the ratifiers’ and Framers’ subjective understanding 
of the provision.  This historical evidence falls into two general categories: 
inquiries into the regulatory practices during the colonial and founding 
eras, and cases interpreting state takings clause analogs. 
A. Colonial and Founding Era Land Use Regulations 
In Euclid v. Ambler Realty, the seminal case upholding comprehensive 
zoning, Justice Sutherland explained: 
 
 28. See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
38–41 (1969) (using British practices and history to elucidate the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757, 764 (1994) (same).  See also Treanor, supra note 1, at 785–87 (observing that 
colonial charters lacked compensation guarantees). 
 29. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION 
OF LIBERTY 89–91 (2004); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. 
REV. 327, 341 n.51 (2002). 
 30. See Treanor, supra note 1, at 791 (arguing that, absent a ratification record, 
“Madison’s statements thus provide unusually significant evidence about what the clause 
was originally understood to mean.”). 
 31. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 9, at 29–34, 54–58 (discussing the intellectual history 
of the Takings Clause); EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 19–31 (same). 
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Building zone laws are of modern origin.  They began in this country about 
twenty-five years ago.  Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; 
but with the great increase and concentration of population, problems have 
developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to 
require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private 
lands in urban communities.32 
It is now well accepted that Sutherland’s tale was mythological.  
Notably, scholars such as John Hart have established that land use 
regulations were a pervasive fact of life during the colonial and founding 
eras.33  For example, fire codes prohibited the erection of wooden 
buildings and permitted local authorities to demolish sound houses to 
prevent further conflagration; affirmative use requirements mandated 
that owners improve both agricultural and urban property; poor laws 
empowered local authorities to take over the property of dissolute 
residents in order to generate support for family members; local, colonial, 
and state codes regulated the location and even appearance of buildings; 
and the rights of land speculators were dramatically curtailed.34  
Compensation for the economic losses sustained as a result of these 
regulations was rare.  On the other hand, owners were usually, but not 
always, compensated when their property was seized for public use.35 
Some scholars, including John Hart, have used the fact that the 
Takings Clause was proposed and ratified against this backdrop of 
pervasive land use regulation to argue that the Clause could not have 
been intended to mandate compensation for regulatory takings.36  Hart 
argues: 
If anyone had felt that contemporary manifestations of the power to regulate 
land use unreasonably threatened landowners’ autonomy, then the period 
surrounding the ratification of the Constitution would have been a good time to 
speak up and propose constitutionalizing land use law. . . . Instead, Congress 
adopted a compensation provision in 1789 covering only “property . . . taken for 
public use.”  . . . If the first Congress had wanted to shift the boundary line 
between public power and private prerogative, so that regulation as well as 
appropriation of land were subject to review under the new Takings Clause, that 
would have been a great novelty.  We should not read such a novelty into a text 
without some clear evidence showing that contemporaries understood it that 
way.37 
 
 32. 272 U.S. 365, 386–87 (1926). 
 33. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 3, at 1259–81; Hart, Land Use Law 
in the Early Republic, supra note 3, at 1007–1131. 
 34. See NOVAK, supra note 5, at 68; Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 3, at 
1259, 1277, 1280; Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 3, at 1109–14, 
1123. 
 35. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 3, at 1134. 
 36. See id. at 1133–35; Treanor, supra note 1, at 787–91. 
 37. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 3, at 1133–35 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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Even after accepting the record of land use regulations amassed by 
Hart and others, I am not sure that it supports the inference suggested by 
Hart.  I agree that neither the Congress that adopted the Takings Clause, 
nor the states that ratified it, intended to disrupt local and state 
regulatory practices.  But, of course, these men did not intend, with the 
Fifth Amendment, to disrupt state and local compensation practices at 
all.  At the time that it was ratified, the Fifth Amendment did not apply 
to the states any more so than did the Establishment Clause.38  Just as the 
first Congress did not understand the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause to require states to disestablish their official churches, it also did 
not understand the Takings Clause to mandate compensation, even for 
physical takings, in the states.  And, just as several states continued to 
maintain established churches in the decades following the First Amendment’s 
ratification, a number of states also did not adopt a takings clause until 
well into the nineteenth century.39 
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the members of the first 
Congress and of the ratification conventions believed that the enumerated 
powers would dramatically limit opportunities for federal regulation of 
private property.  Indeed, the Constitution does explicitly address the 
federal power to regulate property, but in Article IV, not in the Takings 
Clause.  Article IV, Section 3, provides, “The Congress shall have Power to 
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”40  If, at the 
time of the founding, the accepted view was that federal regulatory 
powers were extremely circumscribed, silence on the matter of regulation 
might not necessarily indicate a blanket approval of confiscatory 
regulations.  To be sure, on a few occasions, the federal government did 
exercise its enumerated powers to regulate territorial affairs in ways that 
limited private property owners’ rights—for example, by imposing 
forfeiture penalties for nonresidence.41  Congress also declined to 
 
 38. See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 
(1833). 
 39. See GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 20–24 
(1987) (noting that many states, especially in New England, maintained established 
churches after the ratification of the First Amendment; Massachusetts became the last to 
disestablish its church in 1833).  For the state takings clauses, I actually had a research 
librarian look up when they were adopted:  Connecticut (1818); Maine (1819); Florida 
(1838); Rhode Island (1842); New Jersey (1844); New York (1846). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 41. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 3, at 1139–42. 
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exercise its power to review territorial land use regulations, including 
a number of affirmative use requirements as well as provisions authorizing 
a majority of landowners to compel nonconsenting owners to participate in 
cooperative arrangements.42  In my view, these regulations, as opposed 
to the regulatory practices of state and local governments, go much 
further toward supporting the idea that the Takings Clause did not reach 
regulatory takings. 
I offer one final question about the use of colonial and founding era 
regulatory practices to support the proposition that the Takings Clause 
only reached physical takings, although it is so tentative as to be better 
described as a musing.  Scholars examining the historical land use regulatory 
practices during the colonial era and the early nineteenth century frequently 
treat regulations enacted by towns and cities as interchangeable with 
colonial or state regulations.  Yet, I wonder whether characterizing local 
rules regulating property, especially during the colonial period, as 
analogous to modern “land use regulations” might be making a category 
error. 
A city’s legal status can only be fully understood against the backdrop 
of the historical evolution of the modern American corporation.  Prior to 
the early nineteenth century, American law made no distinction between 
public and private corporations.  A corporation was a corporation—a 
legally distinct entity empowered by a legislative charter to carry out 
defined purposes, which we today would consider both public and 
private.43  The hybrid legal status of corporations, which had ancient 
roots, is relatively easy to understand in the new world context because 
many colonial cities—consider William Penn’s Philadelphia—were 
closely analogous to today’s “planned unit developments.”  Then, as in some 
cases today, the “developer”—in the colonial context, often a chartered 
corporation—retained some regulatory rights as landowner.44 
During the early years of the nineteenth century, American legal 
thinking underwent a remarkable transformation—namely, the conceptual 
separation of the private and public generally, and of private and public 
corporations in particular.45  Business corporations became independent 
 
 42. Id. at 1144–45. 
 43. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 111–22; Gerald E. Frug, The City as a 
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 105, 1101–02 (1980). 
 44. See Joan Williams, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in 
American Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 225, 228 (1985) (reviewing HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC 
PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN 
AMERICAN LAW (1983)). 
 45. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 112–14 (discussing development of the 
distinction between public and private); Frug, supra note 43, at 1100–04 (discussing 
separation of public and municipal corporations); Williams, supra note 44, at 232–35 
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rights holders, constitutionally protected from unreasonable state 
interference.46  Moreover, the gradual erosion of the ultra vires doctrine 
and the passage of general incorporation laws guaranteed the proliferation 
of private corporations with broad authority to engage in a wide range of 
activities.47  In contrast, municipal corporations came to be viewed as 
subordinate to, and carrying out the purposes of, the states.48  By the late 
nineteenth century, private corporations were well on their way toward 
autonomy,49 while municipal corporations had become local governments 
subject to state domination.50 
To the extent that local regulatory practices are relevant to original 
intent analysis—and, for the reasons discussed above, I am skeptical that 
they are—I wonder if we need to better understand whether an informed 
citizen would have categorized a local land use regulation as a public or 
private act, or some hybrid.  By the time of Dartmouth College, the 
conceptual severance of public and private was developed well enough 
to be accorded constitutional significance by the Supreme Court.51  Certainly 
by that time, state courts had begun to recognize the regulatory actions 
of local governments as public exercises of the police power.52  On the 
other hand, Hedrik Hartog’s excellent case study of New York suggests 
that as late as 1850, most New Yorkers viewed the city, in some sense, 
as both public and private.53  Moreover, there clearly were regional 
 
(discussing the role of municipal corporations in the development of the distinction 
between public and private). 
 46. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 111–14. 
 47. See HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 77–78; Frug, supra note 43, at 1101 (describing 
the “Jacksonian effort to pass general incorporation laws, thus allowing the ‘privilege’ of 
incorporation to be exercised by all.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 43, at 1100–04. 
 49. Cf. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1485 (1988) (describing “[t]he 
Middle Period [of corporate development]—the 1850s to the 1880s,” when “[t]he states 
enacted ‘general corporation laws’ to assure equal access to the corporate form . . . .”); 
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 208 (noting that “[t]he 
pervasive adoption of general incorporation statutes by many states during the latter half 
of the 19th century did not signal abdication of the regulatory notion of corporate law.”). 
 50. Frug, supra note 43, at 1108 (describing how local autonomy gave way to state 
control in the late nineteenth century). 
 51. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 617 (1819). 
 52. See, e.g., Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. (13 Tyng) 272, 272, 278 (1816); Eustis 
v. Parker, 1 N.H. 273, 275 (1818). 
 53. HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW 1730–1870, at 4–5, 240–41, 256–60 
(1983). 
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differences in popular perceptions of local actions.54  It strikes me that 
these perceptions might be relevant to the categorization of both local 
regulations and perhaps also of colonial laws empowering local governments 
to regulate property—which we today would call enabling acts.55 
B.  State Cases and the Federal Takings Clause 
My final two questions both concern the use of nineteenth century 
state cases to discern the original meaning of the terms of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.  In the Takings Clause context, there are 
virtually no federal decisions interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s 
compensation requirement until the late nineteenth century, perhaps in 
large part because the federal government relied upon states to condemn 
property for it.56  This has led a number of scholars to mine volumes of 
early state court reports in an effort to uncover whether state courts ever 
held that state constitutional provisions akin to the Takings Clause 
required compensation for regulatory takings.57 
In a footnote in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, Justice Scalia hinted 
that these cases were “entirely irrelevant”58 to modern takings analysis 
because they were decided prior to the incorporation of the Takings 
Clause in 1897.59  While, for the reasons discussed above, I wonder if 
early state and local regulatory practices are probative of the original 
meaning of the Takings Clause, it strikes me that early decisions 
interpreting state law takings analogues are probative.  At least to the 
extent that these decisions resolved questions akin to the modern 
regulatory takings dilemma—that is, whether regulations diminishing 
property value ran afoul of constitutional protections that mirror the 
Takings Clause—they can help us understand what the terms of the 
Takings Clause meant at the time it was enacted.  As my colleague A.J. 
 
 54. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 44, at 231–38 (contrasting New York and New 
England traditions). 
 55. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 3, at 1274–84 (discussing colonial 
era laws empowering or mandating local land use regulations). 
 56. Treanor, supra note 1, at 794. 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 792–94; see also, e.g., Claeys, supra note 11, at 1553–54; 
Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings 
Thesis “Goes Too Far,” 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 228–40 (1999); Kris W. Kobach, The 
Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211, 
1285–87. 
 58. 505 U.S. at 1028, n.15 (“Justice Blackmun expends a good deal of throw-
weight of his own upon a noncombatant, arguing that our description of the 
‘understanding’ of land ownership that informs the Takings Clause is not supported by 
early American experience.  That is largely true, but entirely irrelevant.  The practices of 
the States prior to incorporation of the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses . . . were out 
of accord with any plausible interpretation of those provisions.”). 
 59. See Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236–38 (1897). 
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Bellia has noted, during the early years of the Republic, state court 
decisions often provide the best evidence about the meaning of a federal 
provision because, especially during those first decades, state courts did 
the overwhelming majority of all judicial work, including the work of 
interpreting the Constitution and federal statutes.60  There are, however, 
two difficulties with using this state court evidence: identifying the 
temporal range of decisions relevant to original meaning analysis and 
making sure that the state courts were in fact responding to questions 
akin to modern regulatory takings claims. 
1.  Early Cases, Not Late Ones? 
My first question about state court evidence is certainly not unique to 
the takings context: In relying on early decisional law to discern the 
original meaning of a constitutional provision, it is, of course, important 
to cabin the universe of relevant cases to those most likely to reflect 
founding era understanding of relevant legal terms.  As Justice Thomas 
observed in Kelo v. New London, the probative value of state court 
decisions diminishes dramatically as time passes.61  Since judicial 
interpretations of constitutional provisions may evolve over time, the 
farther away from the founding, the greater the risk that a decision 
reflects a modern, rather than a founding era, understanding.62 
The difficulty is that there are relatively few cases interpreting state 
takings clauses in the years following the ratification of the Fifth 
Amendment.63  This is not surprising in light of the fact that only eight 
states—fewer than half of the total number admitted—adopted takings 
clauses before 1815, roughly a generation after the founding.64  The 
 
 60. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 
59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1504–07 (2006). 
 61. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 513–14 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (noting that mid-nineteenth century cases are not “deeply probative” of the 
Fifth Amendment’s original meaning). 
 62. See id. at 514. 
 63. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF 
PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND WITHOUT PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS 106–07 
(1973); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The 
Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and “Takings” Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 75–76 (1986). 
 64. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. II; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. X; PA. 
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 10; KY. CONST. art. 12, § 12 (1792); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. 
I, § 8; ILL. CONST.; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 21 (1796); OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (1802). 
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relative paucity of early decisional law has led some scholars to extend 
the universe of cases relevant to original meaning analysis well into the 
nineteenth century.65  This strikes me as problematic, especially in light 
of the dramatic shifts in both the reality of, and philosophical or ideological 
thinking about, economic life during the nineteenth century—changes 
which may make the risk of interpretive drift particularly sharp in the 
Takings Clause context. 
2.  The Same Questions, Not Different Ones? 
Several scholars have challenged the standard characterization of early 
state decisions as limiting compensation to physical takings.66  Having 
not exhaustively reviewed the case law, I leave the battle over the weight 
of the judicial record to those who have.  But, I would like to close by 
raising a different question about the characterization of early state 
cases.  It strikes me that the decisions which are most probative of 
whether the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, as originally understood, 
was meant to mandate compensation for regulatory takings are those that 
(1) interpreted state constitutional provisions substantially similar to the 
Federal Takings Clause—that is, by prohibiting “takings” without “just 
compensation”—and (2) resolved questions akin to the modern regulatory 
takings claim—that is, by addressing if or when a regulation that “goes 
too far” becomes a taking.  If a state takings provision departed dramatically 
from the text of the Takings Clause or the courts were resolving different 
questions, then the case law’s probative value diminishes dramatically. 
The principle danger of relying on early state cases is not a problem of 
constitutional text—most state takings clauses closely paralleled their 
federal counterpart—but rather the risk of anachronism: We might read 
decisions to be responding to the questions we expect in the regulatory 
takings context when in fact the courts were asking and answering quite 
different ones.  For example, Eric Claeys has argued that nineteenth 
century courts “did not organize takings cases under the same categories 
that we apply now,” but rather divided the regulatory world between 
valid “regulations” and invalid or compensatory “invasions” of property 
rights.67  And, more recently, Bradley Karkkainen has argued that modern 
courts and scholars have misread two seminal federal decisions, Chicago 
B. & Q.68 and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,69 as takings cases—
 
 65. See, e.g., Claeys, supra note 11, at 1549 (studying nineteenth century 
regulatory takings cases); Kobach, supra note 57, at 1223–59 (studying antebellum 
regulatory takings cases). 
 66. See Gold, supra note 57, at 228–40; Kobach, supra note 57, at 1223–59. 
 67. Claeys, supra note 11, at 1553. 
 68. 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
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the cases that incorporated the Takings Clause and invented regulatory 
takings, respectively—when, in fact, both were due process decisions.70 
Leaving these thought provoking arguments to one side, it is clear that 
some of the cases used to support the standard account did not directly 
ask whether a textual takings provision required compensation for the 
economic effects of regulation.  Some of the earliest decisions resolving 
questions of compensation relied not on a textual takings provision, but 
on natural rights principles.71  Many commonly cited cases that did 
interpret a takings clause are better characterized as consequential rather 
than regulatory takings decisions—that is, they concern the compensation 
for damage resulting as a consequence of a physical taking,72 which 
continues to be a contested issue today.73  Other commonly cited cases 
did not discuss the issue of compensation, but rather involved disputes 
about the scope of governmental power to regulate at all.  Some of these 
cases were closely akin to modern substantive due process challenges—
they involved assertions that a regulation exceeded the police power74—
 
 69. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 70. Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation 
and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 843–52, 862–67 (2006) 
(arguing that both decisions were due process decisions).  Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 71. See, e.g., Proprietors of Piscataqua Bridge v. N.H. Bridge, 7 N.H. 35, 66 
(1834) (stating that as a matter of right and as one of the first principles of justice, due 
compensation must be provided if one’s property is taken without consent); Sinnickson 
v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 151 (1839) (noting that it was settled principle of law to 
provide just compensation for taking of private property for public use); Gardner v. Trs. 
of Vill. of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 165–66 (N.Y. 1816) (explaining that the trustees 
of the village were planning to divert the stream on plaintiff’s land, but plaintiff has a 
legal right to the use of the water); Kobach, supra note 57, at 1229–32 (discussing 
decisions which assert that natural law principles required compensation for takings). 
 72. See Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. (2 Tyng) 489, 490 (1807) (barring 
construction of a road where compensation procedures are not followed); Sinnickson, 17 
N.J.L. at 151 (deciding that even though the statute did not provide for damages caused 
by the erection of a dam, there is no bar for seeking such damages); Gardner, 2 Johns. 
Ch. at 162 (compensating for consequential damages when trustees attempted to divert 
stream on plaintiff’s land); Cooper v. Williams, 5 Ohio 391, 392–93 (1832) (determining 
whether to assess damages for water diverted from the river to feed into the canal for the 
public welfare); Kobach, supra note 57, at 1223–28 (distinguishing consequential and 
regulatory takings). 
 73. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 558–62 
(2001) (discussing concept of “derivative takings”); 4A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON 
THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.01 [2–3] (3d ed. 1992) (discussing consequential 
damages). 
 74. See, e.g., Baker v. Boston, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 184, 194 (1831) (arguing that 
police regulations to prevent public harm “are not void, although they may in some 
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while others were reminiscent of enabling act questions—they involved 
challenges to a local government’s action as ultra vires.75 
Finally, a related problem that we also cannot know due to the limited 
judicial record is how state courts would have interpreted the Federal 
Takings Clause.  In the statutory construction context, for example, both 
A.J. Bellia and John Manning have argued that, in the early nineteenth 
century, state courts routinely used an “equity of the statute” approach to 
interpret state laws, but they employed a different, textualist approach to 
interpret federal laws.76  Perhaps state court interpretations of state 
compensation guarantees also might have departed in unexpected ways 
from state court interpretations of the federal compensation guarantee.  
State constitutions, after all, are very different documents than the Federal 
Constitution.  As local government law students learn on the first day of 
class, states have plenary power, the federal government—at least 
theoretically—does not.  Perhaps a nineteenth century state court would 
have, if presented with the opportunity, interpreted a compensation 
requirement applied against a backdrop of limited, enumerated powers 
more broadly—or, for that matter, more narrowly—than a similar provision 
applied against a backdrop of plenary police powers. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, I do not know whether the terms of the Takings Clause, as 
originally understood, could have required compensation for a confiscatory 
regulation—for example, a regulation that “denies all economically 
beneficial or productive use of land.”77  I leave that puzzle to the historians, 
along with a few others, which I hope will shed light on the sparse 
historical record surrounding the ratification of the Takings Clause. 
 
 
measure interfere with private rights without providing for compensation.”); Commonwealth 
v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55, 58–59 (1846) (reasoning that a property owner 
could be prevented from moving stones on his private beach without compensation to 
prevent erosion, because such interference is not so severe as to warrant a taking worthy 
of compensation); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851) (upholding a 
statute banning construction of wharfs beyond a certain point in the Boston Harbor). 
 75. See, e.g., Mayor of N.Y. v. Ordrenan, 12 Johns. 121 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) 
(allowing regulation of the storage of gunpowder); Tanner v. Vill. of Albion, 5 Hill 121 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (approving regulation of the operation of a bowling alley). 
 76. See Bellia, supra note 60, at 1506–07; John F. Manning, Textualism and the 
Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 86 n.336 (2001). 
 77. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
